In Gordon Brown 1019:00 21/02/2010 Number, Andrew Rawnsley, Alistair Darling, Douglas Alexander, ed balls, Ed Miliband, extracts, characteristics, Gordon Brown, work, politics, politics of the past, Sarah Brown, the end of the party, observers, news, UK Guardian Unlimited
In the most anticipated political book for years, the Chief Observer political commentator, Andrew Rawnsley, has a gripping account within the Labor government since 2001. Minister here, exclusively, an excerpt from the end of the party, paint a disturbing picture of a beleaguered Brown, tortured and volatile Gordon in their struggle to cope with being First
Gordon Brown entered Number 10 Downing Street on 27 June 2007. He was immediately beset by a series of crises, including attempted terrorist attacks in London and Glasgow, followed by floods in large parts of Britain and an outbreak of FMD. His response to these events apparently secure that generates a honeymoon with the media. While growth rates enjoyed in opinion polls, speculation grew that he would call early general elections.
The idea of an autumn general election came out ahead of Prime Minister in late July. The Council of Ministers were summoned to Checkers just before the summer holidays to be given what one minister remembers as "a presentation instead of saccharin" by Deborah Mattinson, Brown's personal pollster. Once the Cabinet is gone, close adviser of Prime Minister met with him on the ground floor lounge overlooking pretty grounds of the home country.
"He looks strong," said Spencer Livermore, director of political strategy at Number 10. The private survey showed that the Labor Council of Ministers put eight points ahead of the Tories, and suggested that Brown was seen as a leader than David Cameron. Douglas Alexander, the campaign coordinator, and Sue Nye, Brown's political secretary, agreed the results were good. Livermore continued: "You should think about going early." Brown became thoughtful. Did you mean April? "He said, thinking that his aide was suggesting an election in the spring of next year." No, "said Livermore." I refer to the Fall. "Brown, Alexander and Nye all laughed at the audacity of the idea.
Speculation about the election that was encouraged by the increasing advantage of Labor in opinion polls. In the last six months of Tony Blair, the work was behind the Tories in the survey, all but one. Since moving to Brown, Labor was ahead in all the individual surveys. In the second half of July, the government hit or break the psychologically important mark of 40% for the first time in two years.
Brown had "gone round the cabinet table" at the meeting of Checkers, but "most people were still skeptical" about an early election, says a cabinet minister. At this stage, Livermore, was alone in the inner circle of the Prime Minister in pushing hard for the fall. The assistant's return from vacation in August, wrote a note of a list of the pros and cons. Brown spent a copy of the note to his allies in the Cabinet. Ed Balls, was cool, like Ed Miliband. Douglas Alexander was growing warmer, the Prime Minister saying: "We must look at this seriously." But they are not properly considered by Brown and his team in August, partly due to the distraction of Northern Rock and partly because Gordon did not want to think about it because it was a risk. " Brown later told his circle that one of his greatest regrets "lost week". It was only in the first week of September that dug up and reread the note of Livermore. He discussed with Alexander, Balls and Miliband, the way they look into the matter, when the trio, which is supposed to both the innermost thoughts of Brown, asked about an early election in the pre-conference interviews. They were punished "for its continued operation. Because Brown had not decided on the election of autumn - was still far from convinced - but "as a way to play with the conservatives. It was the tactic of strategy," says a member of his inner circle.
Divided in his own mind, Brown found that the cabinet was completely divided as was discussed again shortly before the conference. "Some people were presenting the argument as a new Prime Minister must seek a mandate," said Harriet Harman. "But others remind us that if you have a choice in the afternoon in the previous year, it darkens and then fewer people vote."
Jack Straw, the senior member of the Cabinet, was "always skeptical about an early election. Straw told Brown that it was not worth the risk: "Just an extra two years." They were also hostile to Health Secretary Alan Johnson and Chancellor, Alistair Darling. The Chief Whip, Geoff Hoon, said it would be "a disaster" and said the view that "the Labor vote would have to haemorrhage. They formed an axis that became known as "all old."
Brown's inner circle could not decide for him because they were divided and in flux. Spencer Livermore, the warmest defender, argued with Brown to announce an election in his speech to the conference. Douglas Alexander was growing more optimistic. So was Bob Shrum, the American political consultant who had been close to Brown for years. Ed Miliband remained unconvinced. Ed Balls, was beginning to change my mind, a change that was reflected in the turn taken by Damian McBride. Sue Nye was "a frenzy" about how he would organize a campaign tour leader with such short notice.
Brown studied thoroughly all the signs, the tea leaf or the innards that can indicate the mood of voters. In the week before the conference, became mesmerized by the board of elections, something normally well below the radar of a Prime Minister. Those who talked with him found that he could rattle off the details of the results of the Council throughout the country. He knew exactly, to tens of percentages, how the work had won at the expense of the Conservatives in Birmingham and the Liberal Democrats in Nuneaton. "The Liberal Democrats lost two seats during their conference week," he said happily. He read a great importance in a Labor victory over the Conservatives in Worcester, the city that spawned the iconic figure of Worcester electoral Women. "A 17% swing!" triumphant Prime Minister observed.
Commissioned Deborah Mattinson and Stan Greenberg, pollster American who formerly worked for Tony Blair to make detailed surveys in marginal constituencies that determine the outcome of elections. The raw results of the fieldwork was in on Saturday 22 September. The refined data was ready to be presented to Brown on Sunday, the opening day of the conference in Bournemouth. He assembled his internal team at Highcliff Hotel, overlooking the sandy beach of the town of Dorset. They sat in a suite that had become the prime minister's office for the week of the conference. Alexander, Livermore, Miliband and Shrum were with him in the room, as Stan Greenberg gave his presentation in New York accent. That confused some people here by "using the American terminology. But the headline was pretty clear conclusion: the work was going to win the fall election with a likely majority of 35 to 45. Brown was puzzled. This was not what I had anticipated. The press, crude extrapolations are applied to the results of the survey, suggesting that the work could be done much more than that. "Gordon had been reading the newspapers saying he had to obtain a three-figure majority," one in the room. Brown wrapped up the meeting temper telling pollsters go out and "do more work."
The hot house conference became feverish with speculation. The electoral environment is further exacerbated by the abundant evidence that the work was the road test of campaign propaganda. Saatchi
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